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Comparative Fault and Strict Products
Liability: Are They Compatible?
INTRODUCTION
A major question raised, and left unanswered, by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in its adoption of a comparative negligence
system' is whether or not it should be applied to strict products
liability.2 It is a question that has justifiably aroused a great deal
of discussion and controversy and is now ripe for decision.
The California Supreme Court most recently avoided the
question in Horn v. General Motors3 by finding that the case
was tried long before the decision in Li v. Yellow Cab4 and that
the issue of the applicability of comparative negligence to strict
products liability was neither briefed nor argued on appeal.
All of the various arguments for applying comparative negli-
gence to strict products liability are well represented by a
comprehensive dissent written by Justice Clark in Horn.5 Brief-
ly they are: (1) strict products liability is in fact a fault system;
(2) the policies of risk allocation, cost distribution and upgrad-
ing of product safety standards, which are important rationales
of strict products liability, would not be offended by comparing
fault, since the manufacturer would still be liable for that part
of the harm actually caused by the defect in its product; (3)
society as a whole should not be burdened with, through in-
creased cost of a product, that part of the loss attributable to an
injured plaintiff's own conduct; (4) the application of compara-
tive negligence to strict products liability provides uniformity
in the law; (5) there is a basis for apportioning liability between
1. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858
(1975).
2. The use of the term "strict products liability," in this comment, de-
scribes the cause of action established by the California Supreme Court in
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57,377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963). It is to be distinguished from strict liability, based on concepts of
warranty, and from the traditional concept of strict liability in tort for abnor-
mally dangerous activities.
3. 17 Cal. 3d 359, 370, 551 P.2d 398, 404, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78, 84 (1976).
4. See note 1, supra.
5. See note 3, supra (Clark, J. dissenting).
a manufacturer who places a defective product on the market
and a negligent plaintiff; (6) the policies supporting strict prod-
ucts liability and those supporting comparative negligence are
compatible.
We can reasonably foresee, in the near future, a California
Supreme Court decision which will answer the question. 6 With
recent changes in the court, it would be difficult to predict
which direction the decision will take. However, the arguments
for the application of comparative negligence to strict products
liability are, at least on the surface, as persuasive as the au-
thorities advocating such a change are impressive.'
The purpose of this comment is to explore: (1) the nature of
strict products liability as applied in California; (2) the underly-
ing policy reasons which the California approach is based upon;
(3) the compatibility of such policies with those policies support-
ing comparative negligence; and (4) the practical effect that the
application of comparative negligence will have on the doctrine
of strict products liability as it exists in California today.
Without such an analysis and conscientious survey of the rea-
sons for, and the nature of, this distinctive remedy, we may
abandon it in favor of the "equitable principles of comparative
fault" and in the interest of "uniformity in the law" 8 without
good cause. This author feels that it is the least that can be done
for a doctrine that has been uniquely given life by a progressive
court, exhumed from the morass of negligence and warranty
concepts, and is now potentially subject to re-internment in the
same sod.
WHY STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY?
The policy considerations which prompted the California Su-
preme Court to adopt a system of strict products liability were
first given consideration in California in a concurring opinion
by Justice Traynor in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. in 1944.9
6. Currently before the court are at least two cases which raise the issue of
the applicability of comparative negligence to strict products liability; Daly v.
General Motors Corp., L.A. 30687 (2 Civ. 46925). Unpublished opinion. Petition
for hearing after the court of appeal reversed a judgment entered on a jury
verdict in favor of defendants on an action for wrongful death arising out of a
single car automobile accident; Campbell v. Southern Pacific, L.A. 30540 (2 Civ.
43810). Unpublished opinion.
7. See authorities cited by Justice Clark, note 4, supra. Many jurisdictions
have already applied their comparative negligence scheme to strict products
liability, this aspect will be dealt with more specifically later in this comment.
8. Horn v. General Motors Corp, 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr
78 (1976) (Clark, J., dissenting).
9. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
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These policy considerations are significant in their emphasis on
the doctrine of "enterprise liability" or "risk distribution"
theory and the lack of emphasis given to fault concepts.
Justice Traynor reasoned that those who suffer from defec-
tive products are unprepared to meet its consequences, and
that:
The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an over-
whelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the
risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer, and distributed
among the people as a cost of doing business. It is to the public interest
to discourage the marketing of products having defects that are a
menace to the public. If such products nevertheless find their way into
the market it is to the public interest to place the responsibility for
whatever injury they may cause upon the manufacturer, who even if
he is not negligent in the manufacture of the product, is responsible
for its reaching the market. However intermittently such injuries may
occur and hazardly they may strike, the risk of their occurrence is a
constant risk and a general one. Against such a risk there should be a
general and constant protection and the manufacturer is best suited to
afford such protection. 10 (emphasis added)
This famous concurring opinion recognized the historical,
economic, and social developments that created a mandate for
strict products liability. Describing the change in the structure
of the market, the complexity of current manufacturing pro-
cesses and the remote relationship between the consumer and
the manufacturer, he noted that "The consumer no longer has
means or skills enough to investigate for himself the soundness
of a product, and his erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by the
steady efforts of manufacturers to build up confidence by ad-
vertising and marketing devices such as trade marks.""
Such policy considerations were not the only impetus in the
development of strict products liability. The cumbersome reme-
dies available under negligence and warranty concepts were
fraught with proof problems for the plaintiff. In an action based
upon negligence the plaintiff was confronted with proving neg-
ligence against a remote manufacturer and the intervening han-
dlers of the product.12 Additionally, although it was already
possible to enforce strict liability by resort to a series of warran-
ty actions, it was an expensive, time-consuming and wasteful
10. Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 441.
11. Id. at 467-68, 150 P.2d at 443-44.
12. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1114-1119 (1960).
process which caused Dean Prosser to comment, "What is
needed is a blanket rule which makes any supplier in the chain
liable directly to the ultimate user, and so short circuits the
whole unwieldy process. '13
The American Law Institute, aware of the problems in the
area and of the growing desire for a remedy which would pro-
tect consumers in a modern technological society, adopted Sec-
tion 402 A of the Second Restatement of Torts. 14 It established a
rule which emphasized consumer protection and eliminated the
problems inherent in the remedies available under negligence
and warranty concepts.
In a comment to Section 402 A, the nature of the remedy
established is precisely defined:
Since the liability with which this Section deals is not based upon the
negligence of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule applied to strict
liability cases (see §524) applies. Contributory negligence of the plain-
tiff is not a defense when such negligence consists merely in a failure
to discover the defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility
of its existence ... 15
(emphasis added)
The California Supreme Court adopted this Restatement rem-
edy in a landmark case in 1963, Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc. ,16 wherein Justice Traynor reiterated the policy dis-
cussion from his concurring opinion in Escola by stating: "The
purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries
resulting from defective products are borne by the manufactur-
ers that put such products on the market rather than by the
injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves."17
The development of the doctrine of strict products liability in
California has been primarily concerned with consumer protec-
tion and compensation. It is recognized that the manufacturer is
better able to bear the loss since such loss can be reflected in the
cost of goods and liability insurance. By imposing a greater risk
13. Id. at 1124.
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A (1965), reads as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or his property, if
a. the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
b. it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule used in subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has
exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product,
and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
15. Id. comment n.
16. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
17. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
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of liability on the manufacturer the quality and safety of goods
will improve. Very simply, therefore, this policy is designed to
protect the mass of consumers who have relied on the manufac-
turer to produce a product without an injury producing defect,
who have generally not insured themselves against such unex-
pected losses and who are powerless to protect themselves.
The progression of cases in California supports the proposi-
tion that the fundamental approach is one of consumer protec-
tion and compensation. In Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. ,18 the
court held that manufacturer liability could not be avoided by
reliance on the retailer to prevent or correct defects and that the
requirement of notice of breach of warranty is not applicable to
strict products liability. In Elmore v. American Motors Corp.,19
the court held that strict products liability extended to bystan-
ders. In Price v. Shell Oil Co.,20 the court held that a lessor,
being an integral part of the overall marketing enterprise,
should be held accountable for injuries from defective prod-
ucts, despite the nonexistence of a sales transaction. In Cronin
v. J.B.E. Olson Corp. ,21 the court rejected the "unreasonably
dangerous" standard, as adopted by Section 402 A of the Re-
statement,2 2 stating that such requirement burdens the plaintiff
with proof of an element "which rings of negligence. ' '23 In Lu-
que v. McLean,2 4 the court stated that the consumer need not
prove that he was unaware of the defect. In Ault v. Internation-
al Harvester Co. ,25 the court held that evidence of subsequent
remedial measures, which are ordinarily inadmissible in negli-
gence cases, are admissible in strict products liability cases.
Finally, most recently in Horn v. General Motors,26 the court
approved the exclusion of evidence on seat belt use, since
conduct which constitutes negligence is not a defense to strict
products liability.
The foregoing does not constitute an exhaustive review of
18. 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
19. 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969).
20. 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970).
21. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
22. See text cited at note 13, supra.
23. 8 Cal. 3d at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
24. Id. at 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).
25. 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812"(1973).
26. 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1976).
cases decided by the California Supreme Court in the area of
strict products liability, but includes the important decisions
reflecting the momentum of the underlying policy in favor of
consumer protection and compensation.
Implicit in the reasoning thus far noted is the concept that
liability is imposed for harm produced by a product without
proof that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care. The
distinction between strict products liability and liability based
on failure to use reasonable care was made explicit in Jiminez v.
Sears, Roebuck & Company,27 where the court held it was error
not to give requested instructions on negligence issues as well as
strict liability when both had been plead and litigated. Also, as
noted earlier, the holding in Cronin, that it was not error to
refuse to instruct in the Restatement of Torts 2d §402 A terms of
"a defective condition unreasonably dangerous" rejects a gen-
eral standard of reasonableness of conduct for one of "strict
liability" for injury from defects.
This lack of concern for finding culpable conduct, to any
degree, on the part of the manufacturer, supplier or retailer,
again emphasizes the basic rationale of strict products liability:
consumer protection from, and compensation for, injuries re-
ceived as a result of a defective product. It also raises the next
point of discussion, the nature of strict products liability.
THE NATURE OF STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The liability of the manufacturer under strict products liabili-
ty is not that of an insurer. The defendant in such a case is liable
only for injuries caused by its products which are adjudged
defective. The original proposition by Justice Traynor in Esco-
1a28 was stated in terms of "absolute liability." In the Greenman
opinion, however, and in every California decision since, except
one,29 it is referred to as a rule of "strict liability" and is express-
ly characterized as not a rule of "absolute" or "insurer's" lia-
bility.30
27. 4 Cal. 3d 379, 482 P.2d 681, 93 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1971).
28. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944).
29. Christofferson v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 75 Cal. App. 3d 75, 78, 92
Cal. Rptr. 825, 826 (1971).
30. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133-34, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162,
104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972). "We recognize that the words 'unreasonably
dangerous' may also serve the beneficial purpose of preventing the seller from
being treated as the insurer of its products. However, we think that such protec-
tive end is attained by the necessity of proving that there was a defect in the
manufacture or design of the product and that such defect was the proximate
cause of the injuries. Although the seller should not be responsible for all
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To what degree then is strict products liability a fault doc-
trine, i.e., when are the defendant's acts or omissions considered
or evaluated? The answer is: never.
In a cause of action for strict products liability the defendant's
particular acts or omissions are irrelevant. The only relevant
factor is the defective condition of the product. The issue of
reasonable and ordinary care in making the product is not im-
posed on the plaintiff as an element of proof. The focus is on the
character of the products and not the manufacturer's conduct.
31
Such a scheme of fault is consistent with the underlying policy
of strict products liability, i.e., to provide protection and
compensation for those consumers who are powerless to protect
themselves. Once a product is adjudged defective, the search
for fault is at an end and the defendant manufacturer is liable,
regardless of due care considerations, unless of course, some
plaintiff conduct precludes that liability.
As noted in the previous section, attempts to interject
concepts of negligence into actions based on strict products
liability have been consistently rejected by the California Su-
preme Court.3 2 In Cronin the court stated that the interjection
of such concepts would confront a plaintiff with problems of
proof similar to those that had once defeated injured consumers
prior to the adoption of the theory of strict products liability.33
While it is probably correct to say that the term "defect"
connotes fault, or at least a feeling that the defendant has done
something wrong,34 it does not logically follow that strict prod-
injuries involving the use of its products, it should be liable for all injuries
proximately caused by any of its products which are adjudged 'defective.'"
31. Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 121, 528 P.2d 1148,
1152, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 816 (1974). As this article went to press the California
Supreme Court decided Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413,418,
-P.2d-, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 229 (1978). In discussing the dual standard for design
defect the court stated: "Finally, this test reflects our continued adherence to the
principle that, in a product liability action, the trier of fact must focus on the
product, not on the manufacturers conduct, and that the plaintiff need not
prove that the manufacturer acted unreasonably or negligently in order to
prevail in such an action."
32. See notes, 20, 23, 24 and 25 supra.
33. 8 Cal. 3d at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
34. Horn v. General Motors, 17 Cal. 3d 359, 374, 551 P.2d 398, 406, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 78, 86 (1976). See Justice Clark's dissent in regard to his contention that
strict products liability is a fault concept.
ucts liability is a "fault concept" within the general meaning of
the latter term.
Fault, as it is normally applied, raises questions as to whether
the defendant was guilty of an error or defect of judgment or
conduct. It is generally equated to a failure of duty, or negli-
gence. In a legal sense, "fault" means a departure from the
conduct required of a man by society for the protection of
others.35 The search for this type of conduct is the antithesis of
the whole policy underlying strict products liability. The plain-
tiff is not burdened with proof of fault on the part of the defend-
ant, but only with proof of a defect. The acts, or omissions of the
defendant are never relevant to the questions of his liability.
An analogy to the area of strict liability based on warranty
will be illustrative. The buyer is ordinarily required to allege
and prove that he relied on the seller's skill or judgment when
he purchased the injury-causing product. The California Su-
preme Court specifically rejected the necessity of evaluating
such seller conduct in Greenman and stated: "The remedies of
injured consumers ought not to be made to depend upon the
intricacies of the law of sales. '36 The buyer may recover for an
injury resulting from a defective product regardless of the exist-
ence or nonexistence of a seller warranty. The seller's conduct is
just not relevant in strict products liability.
Thus, the statements made by some,37 that strict products
liability is not "absolute" or "insurer's" liability, and that fault is
usually an inherent element of a defect, may be accepted with-
out conceding that the doctrine is a "fault" concept in the sense
that the defendant's conduct is considered in establishing liabil-
ity. The defendant is an insurer to the extent that an injury
proximately results from a product which he has placed on the
market in a defective condition, regardless of his exercise of due
care. The term "defect" may connote fault, but such does not
alter the irrelevancy of defendant's acts or omissions in a cause
of action for strict products liability.
Since it is not the defendant's conduct which is under scrutiny
in strict products liability, but the existence of a defect, some
theoretical and practical difficulties seem to exist in attempting
to compare plaintiff conduct with the mythical and illusive
conduct of the defendant. Those authorities who would hold to
35. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 18 (4th ed. 1971).
36. 59 Cal. 2d at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
37. Dissent by Justice Clark in Horn, note 33, supra. See also Note, Apply-
ing Comparative Negligence to Strict Products Liability, 4 WEST. ST. U.L. REV.
283, 286 (1966).
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the contrary 38 commence with the tenuous proposition that the
manufacturer's conduct has always been under scrutiny in that
a defect cannot exist without someone's fault. This proposition
begs the question of the relevancy of defendant conduct in liti-
gation regarding strict products liability.
We will return to discuss the theoretical and practical difficul-
ties of considering certain types of plaintiff conduct as an offset
to defendant's liability after we survey that type of plaintiff
conduct which is currently considered in strict products liability
cases. We will also conduct a comparison of the Greenman
doctrine with the approach utilized by other jurisdictions.
DEFENSES TO STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
While the Greenman doctrine removed major impediments to
recovery in cases where a defect in the defendant's product had
caused harm, it did not make the manufacturer liable for in-
juries that: were not proximately caused by such defect; result-
ed from an unintended, unforeseeable misuse by the plaintiff;
or occurred after the plaintiff had assumed the risk of such
injury.
The maintenance of these particular traditional defenses, and
the rejection of ordinary contributory negligence as a defense,39
are entirely consistent with the policy reasons which support
the unique remedy of strict products liability.
The elimination of contributory negligence as a defense to
strict products liability follows from the recognition that some
carelessness is to be expected from the ordinary consumer. In a
commercial and industrial environment where the consumer
does not have the means or skill to investigate the soundness of
a product, it would be very unfair and unrealistic to impose a
duty upon such consumers to act as a reasonable person in
discovering defects or guarding against their possible existence.
If a manufacturer's defect has placed the consumer in a posi-
tion where his only reasonable course is to confront the danger,
38. Id. See also Comment, Tort Defenses to Strict Products Liability, 20
SYRACUSE L. REv. 924, 925-28 (1969); SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 204-05
(1974).
39. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121,127, 501 P.2d 1153,1157, 104
Cal. Rptr. 433,437 (1972). Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136,145,501 P.2d 1163, 1167,
104 Cal. Rptr. 443, 449 (1972).
then the manufacturer should bear the loss. This is the very
situation that the remedy of strict products liability was design-
ed for. Such a consumer is a person powerless to protect him-
self.4
0
Conduct, however, which goes beyond this and is tantamount
to a conscious election to risk injury may be a defense if it falls
within the definition of assumption of the risk as set out most
clearly in Luque v. McLean.:
Ordinary contributory negligence does not bar recovery in a strict
liability action. The only form of plaintiff's negligence that is a de-
fense to strict liability is that which consists in voluntarily and un-
reasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, more
commonly referred to as assumption of risk. For such a defense to
arise, the user or consumer must become aware of the defect and
danger and still proceed unreasonably to make use of the product.4 1
The underlying policies of strict products liability are not
offended when a plaintiff is barred recovery because of his
subjective consensual assumption of the risk of injury from a
known defect. In such a case, the consumer knows of the danger
and, in the face of a reasonable escape or avoidance, has elected
to confront the danger. Such a person is fully able to protect
himself and is one who does not need the protection of the
unique remedy of strict products liability.
In Li v. Yellow Cab,42 the California Supreme Court abolish-
ed the defense of assumption of risk to the extent that it is
merely a variant of the former doctrine of contributory negli-
gence. 43 This presents the anomaly of making the defense of
assumption of risk more easily available to a defendant in a
strict products liability case than to a defendant in a negligence
case.
44
40. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897,
901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
41. 8 Cal. 3d 136, 145, 501 P.2d 1163, 1169, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443, 449-50 (1972).
42. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 829, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 875 (1975).
43. Id. at 824-25, 532 P.2d at 1240, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 872. The court defines
the overlap:
As for assumption of risk, we have recognized in this state that this
defense overlaps that of contributory negligence to some extent and in
fact is made up of at least two distinct defenses. 'To simplify greatly, it
has been observed . . . that in one kind of situation, to wit, where a
plaintiff unreasonably undertakes to encounter a specific known risk
imposed by a defendant's negligence, plaintiff's conduct, although he
may encounger that risk in a prudent manner, is in reality a form of
contributory negligence .... Other kinds of situations within the doc-
trine of assumption of risk are those, for example, where plaintiff is held
to agree to relieve defendant of an obligation of reasonable conduct
toward him. Such a situation would not involve contributory negligence,
but rather a reduction of defendant's duty of care.'
44. See Use Note accompanying BAJI 9.02 CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
CIVIL [Baji] 9.02 (5th ed. Supp. 1975).
Comparative Fault and Strict Liability
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
It is urged that this dichotomy of results may be avoided by
applying comparative negligence to strict products liability.
45
While this approach might possibly benefit those plaintiffs who
have assumed the risk of danger, it resurrects obstacles, which
were purposefully eliminated by the Greenman doctrine, for all
other plaintiffs for whom the doctrine was designed to protect
and compensate.
46
The plaintiff's conduct may negate an essential element of a
strict products liability case although it amounts neither to neg-
ligence nor assumption of the risk. If the plaintiff's conduct is
the sole proximate47 cause of the harm, no defect traceable to
the defendant can be a proximate cause and recovery is barred.
There is nothing in the Greenman doctrine which dispenses
with proof of proximate cause.48
This is consistent both with general principles of tort law and
the policy of strict products liability of compensation for in-
juries caused by defects. However, there is a controversy re-
garding the so-called "second accident" situation. California,
consistent with its consumer oriented policy, allows recovery
where a defect has caused an injury due to an occurrence which
the defect did not bring about.49
The California approach to the second accident situation is
45. See Horn v. General Motors, 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr.
78 (1976) (Clark, J., dissenting); Note, Applying Comparative Negligence to
Strict Products Liability, 4 WEST. ST. U.L. REV. 283, 290 (1977); SCHWARTZ,
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 201 (1974).
46. See quote from Greenman note 16, supra.
47. Magee v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 348-350, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 322, 326-338 (1963). Plaintiff was denied recovery against a drug manufac-
turer for side effects he suffered when plaintiff's doctor prescribed a drug
manufactured by defendant. The doctor had been warned by the defendant that
the drug should not be given to people with certain allergies. The plaintiff was
one of those persons and the court held that the doctor's negligence, not any
defect in the drug, was the proximate cause of the injury.
48. Greenberg v. General Air-Cond. Corp., 233 Cal. App. 2d 545,549,43 Cal.
Rptr. 662, 665 (1965).
49. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121,126, 501 P.2d 1153, 1157, 104
Cal. Rptr. 433, 437 (1972). Contrary to this view the court in Evans v. General
Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), held that the manufacturer was not
responsible where the condition of an object, for which the defendant was
responsible, caused an injury because of an occurrence, an accident which the
condition did not cause; In Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir.
1968) the court discussed aspects of the manufacturer's duty to inspect and to
test for designs that would cause an unreasonable risk of foreseeable injury and
refused to follow EVans, 391 F.2d at 506.
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most recently illustrated in Horn, where the plaintiff was al-
lowed to recover for injuries incurred as a result of a defective
horn cap when her face struck exposed sharp prongs after an
accident which occurred for reasons other than as a result of the
alleged defective condition. 50
This approach enhances the underlying policies of consumer
protection by creating an incentive for production of safer prod-
ucts and consumer compensation for injuries proximately
caused by defects. Yet it is not unfair to the defendant since he is
only liable for that part of the injury attributable to the defect.
The plaintiff's conduct may also negate an essential element
of a strict products liability case if he "misuses" a product. The
misuse can negate a claim that the product was being put to its
intended use or refute a defective condition or causation. 51 The
misuse must be one that is not reasonably foreseeable by the
defendant 52 and the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove
that he utilized the product in a reasonably foreseeable manner.
If the plaintiff fails in this burden, the cause of action will fail
either on the ground that there was no defect or on the ground
that the product, defective or not, was not a proximate cause of
the injury. The overlap between unforeseeable misuse and pro-
ximate cause is apparent, but the underlying consideration is
the same: is there plaintiff conduct which precludes liability of
the defendant.
It is doubtful, however, that the application of comparative
negligence to strict products liability would entail the abolition
of unforeseeable misuse as a complete bar to liability. Professor
Schwartz, in his often quoted treatise on comparative negli-
gence, recommends that comparative negligence should not ap-
ply to unintended unforeseeable misuse of a product by the
plaintiff. His approach is based on the premise that in such a
case the defendant has not violated a duty to the plaintiff and
therefore there is no basis for recovery.53
50. See note 3, supra.
51. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256,391 P.2d 168,37 Cal. Rptr.
896 (1964). Reversed for a new trial because plaintiffs made a strict liability case
that was sufficient to carry them to the jury. On a re-trial the jury found that the
automobile accident was not due to the asserted defects but apparently was
influenced by the fact that the driver was operating the vehicle in the dirt
shoulder of the road instead of on paved area just prior to accident. "It is
incumbent upon a plaintiff to prove that he was using the article in a way that it
was intended to be used as a result design and manufacture of which plaintiff
was not aware that made the unsafe for its intended use." Tresham v. Ford
Motor Co., 275 Cal. App. 2d 403, 410, 79 Cal. Rptr. 833, 837 (1969).
52. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTION, CIVIL [BAJI] § 9.00 (5th ed. Supp. 1975).
53. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 199 (1974).
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Regardless of the premise that you base this limitation to
liability on, i.e., nonexistence of a defect, not the proximate
cause of the injury or no failure of a duty, the result is justified
and is consistent with the policies underlying strict products
liability. The defendant is an insurer of only those products
which are defective when they leave his control and are the
proximate cause of an injury.
The defenses to strict products liability, as discussed above,
involve a limited evaluation of the plaintiff's conduct to estab-
lish one or more of the following: (1) that there was no defect,
i.e., an unintentional, unforeseeable misuse occured; (2) that the
defective product was not a proximate cause of the injury, i.e.,
plaintiff's conduct or some other factor was the proximate
cause (this overlaps easily with unintended, unforeseeable mis-
use); (3) the plaintiff assumed the risk of the danger presented
by the defect. These defenses focus on whether a defective prod-
uct, defective when it left the defendant's hands, was the proxi-
mate cause of an injury incurred by a person powerless to
protect himself.
Beyond those considerations, the plaintiff's conduct is not
relevant. The plaintiff's failure to discover or foresee danger is
not relevant because of the basic policy reasons discussed
above:5 4 the mass of consumers are powerless to protect them-
selves; their ability to investigate and determine the soundness
of products in today's commercial environment is severely lim-
ited; the manufacturer is the father of the transaction, he makes
the article and puts it in the stream of commerce and profits
from the commerce; and, the fact that the manufacturers and
suppliers exercise massive and persistent efforts in gaining the
confidence of consumers by advertising and marketing devices
such as trade marks. In effect, such defendants are estopped
from asserting the reliance upon, and confidence of consumers
in, the array of products on today's markets.
In California there is an additional policy reason of major
importance: the doctrine of "enterprise liability" or "risk distri-
bution theory. 5 5 This theory has received little mention in the
54. See quotes cited at Notes 10 & 11, supra.
55. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57,
377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson, 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501
decisions outside California,56 and is thereby illustrative of the
uniqueness of the California remedy and its emphasis on
consumer protection and compensation.
The limitations to liability that currently apply to strict prod-
ucts liability in California were designed to screen only those
who are undeserving of the unique remedy of strict products
liability. When a plaintiff has successfully maneuvered the hur-
dles of assumption of the risk, unintended unforeseeable misuse
and proximate cause, he has demonstrated that he is a person
for whom the Greenman doctrine was designed to protect and
compensate: a consumer who is powerless to protect himself
from injuries proximately caused by a defective product which
was defective when it left the defendant's hands.57
THE Greenman DOCTRINE-A UNIQUE APPROACH
A popular argument in support of the application of compara-
tive negligence to strict products liability is to point to those
jurisdictions that have adopted such an approach. This argu-
ment may have merit if the approaches utilized by these other
jurisdictions are based on the same policy reasoning as the
Greenman doctrine.
In Dippel v. Sciano58 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin applied
comparative negligence to strict products liability by reasoning
that the liability of the defendant is not grounded upon a failure
to exercise ordinary care with its necessary element of foreseea-
P.2d 1153,104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972); Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136,501 P.2d 1163,
104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972). See also quote cited at note 16, supra.
56. Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGS
L.J. 9, 20 (1966). Dean Prosser reasons that this is true because the "risk distribu-
tion" theory "embarks upon a broad theory of 'enterprise liability' from which
the courts thus far have tended to shy away."
57. In this regard it should be remembered that the defendant is only liable
for the injury or aggravation of an injury proximately caused by a defective
product which he has placed on the market. Thus in effect the damages are
already apportioned to a certain extent on the basis of proximate cause. See
Horn v. General Motors, 17 Cal. 3d 359, 366, 551 P.2d 398, 401, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78, 81
(1976), where the court states this measure of damages: ". . . if the station wagon
was defectively designed or manufactured in such a manner that the horn
assembly caused plaintiff to sustain greater injuries in the collision than she
would have otherwise sustained absent the defect, then the manufacturer and
distributor of the vehicle would be liable to the extent of such aggravation of her
injuries."
See Horn v. General Motors, 17 Cal. 3d 359, 373, 551 P.2d 398, 405, 131
Cal. Rptr. 78, 86 (1976) (Clark, J., dissenting), where he cites decisions of other
jurisdictions to support his argument. See also: Note, Applying Comparative
Negligence to Strict Products Liability, 4 WEST. ST. U.L. REv. 283 (1977), which
is based on Butaud v. Suburban Marine and Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42
(Alaska 1976), wherein comparative negligence was applied to strict products
liability; Treatise cited at note 52, supra at 195-209.
58. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 115 N.W. 2d 555 (1967).
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bility, but rather upon a theory similar to negligence per se.5 9 It
appears that the Wisconsin court hoped to avoid the theoretical
and conceptual difficulties of comparing the mere existence of
a defect with the contributory negligence of a plaintiff by sim-
ply characterizing strict products liability as negligence per se.
Negligence per se involves conduct by the defendant which
amounts to a violation of a standard of care fixed by statute or
previous decision. "The employment of a minor child in viola-
tion of the statute is an instance of the first kind, and the failure
to stop, look and listen is the most common illustration of the
second type."60 Such a standard eliminates foreseeability as an
element of negligence, but it does not eliminate the failure of
duty as an element. The conduct of the defendant is relevant in
negligence per se.
In a concurring opinion to Dippel by Justice Hallows, the
courts result is explained very well:
I think the majority opinion is unnecessarily misleading in attempting
to state the position of the court. The issue is stated in terms of strict
liability and is also stated that we adopt the rule of strict liability in
tort as set forth in Sec. 402A of the Restatement, Torts 2d. I think not.
The Restatement is in terms of liability, but if we are to keep the
doctrine of comparative negligence, which is one of the bulwarks
against strict liability in Wisconsin jurisprudence, our statement of the
first step in the solution of product liability cases must clearly be in
terms of negligence and not [strict] liability. It is a plainly misleading
statement to say we adopt the strict liability rule but we do not mean
it. (emphasis added)
What we mean is that a seller who meets the conditions of Sec. 402 A,
Restatement, Torts 2d, in Wisconsin is guilty of negligence as a matter
of law and such negligence is subject to the ordinary rules of causa-
tion and the defense applicable to negligence. While the Restatement,
Torts 2d, Sec. 402 A, imposes a strict or absolute liability regardless
of the negligence of the seller, we do not. (emphasis added) ... I
concur on the express ground that the liability rests on negligence.6 1
The mixing of "apples and oranges" is not the only material
variance from the Greenman doctrine by the Wisconsin court. It
is noted that the court adopted 2 the "unreasonably dangerous"
standard of Restatement 2d, Section 402 A, which was rejected
by the California Supreme Court in Cronin.6 3 Additionally,
59. Id. at 462, 155 N.W. 2d at 64.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 464, 155 N.W. 2d at 65, 66.
62. Id. at 461, 155 N.W. 2d at 63.
63. See note 29, supra.
there is no reference by the Wisconsin Court to the "risk distri-
bution" theory which stands as a major rationale of the Green-
man doctrine.64
Dippel is an often cited case by the proponents of the applica-
tion of comparative negligence to strict products liability.65
However, these proponents do not include in their discussion of
the case the major differences between the Wisconsin approach
and the Greenman doctrine.
In Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck and Company,66 the U.S. Court
of Appeals applied comparative negligence to strict products
liability, although there was no precedent under Mississippi law
for such an extension. With little discussion and total reliance on
a "noted commmentator", 7 the court approved a jury instruc-
tion which, in effect, allowed the jury to consider the contribu-
tory negligence of the plaintiff in a cause of action for strict
products liability.
Perhaps the court's unreasoned haste in the application of
comparative negligence was predicated on the fact that Missis-
sippi, like Wisconsin, had adopted the "unreasonably danger-
ous" standard of Restatement, Torts 2d Section 402 A. In such a
jurisdiction, the plaintiff is confronted with problems of proof
similar to those involved in negligence action and thus there is
not theoretical difficulty in comparing fault.
Another often cited case is Hegenbuck v. Snap-On Tools
Corp.68 In this case the U.S. District Court applied the New
Hampshire comparative negligence statute to strict products
liability although no New Hampshire decision had previously
done so. The court based its decision on the reasoning that the
New Hampshire contributory negligence statute, which was
previously construed as a defense to strict liability, had been
completely replaced by the comparative negligence statute. In
effect, although this was a movement toward greater emphasis
on consumer protection and compensation, it did not extend
quite far enough to be a comparable remedy to the Greenman
doctrine.
It should also be noted that New Hampshire had adopted
Restatement, Torts 2d, Section 402 A intact, including the "un-
reasonably dangerous" standard rejected in Cronin.
64. See note 44, supra.
65. See note 57, supra.
66. 512 F.2d 276, 290 (5th Cir. 1975).
67. Wade, Strict Tort Liability, 44 MIss. L.J. 825, 850 (1973).
68. 339 F. Supp. 676, 680-682 (D. N.H. 1972).
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The Supreme Court of Alaska, in Butaud v. Suburban Marine
and Sporting Goods, Inc. ,69 applied comparative negligence to
strict products liability, apparently confusing plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence with the concept of proximate cause. In a
footnote the court stated:
Even before its carryover to products cases, strict liability was not
akin to absolute liability when the plaintiff's conduct was a factor in
causing the injury.70
There is no dispute that, even under the Greenman doctrine,
the defendant is liable only for those injuries which were proxi-
mately caused by the defect. It should also be noted here that
Alaska also adopted intact Restatement, Torts 2d, Section
402A.7 1
In a dissent to Butaud,72 Justice Burke stated that the court's
decision represented a significant step backward, in that it ig-
nored the basic, fundamental policy considerations that gave
rise to the doctrine of strict products liability cases. He cited the
policy language from Greenman, s and concluded that:
Clearly, this underlying policy will be given little effect if a plaintiff is
to be held responsible for his own injuries, to the extent that those
injuries are caused by his own ordinary negligence, when he is not
aware of the defect and the dangers associated with that defect. Ac-
cordingly, I would hold that a plaintiff's own negligence is relevant
only in those cases where he is aware of a specific defect and voluntar-
ily procedes to encounter a known danger.
74
The distinctive nature of the Greenman doctrine has been
amply demonstrated by the foregoing discussion. The emphasis
on consumer protection and compensation through the "enter-
prise liability" theory makes it a unique concept and not easily
compared with the approach of less progressive jurisdictions.
With a doctrine which had its judicial origin in California,75
where the courts have developed for themselves a very con-
siderable body of decisions which have fairly well settled the
69. 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976).
70. Id. at 45, (see footnote 14 in case).
71. 4 WEST. ST. U.L. REV. 283, 287 (1977).
72. 555 P.2d 42 (Burke, J., dissenting).
73. See note 16, supra.
74. 555 P.2d at 47.
75. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 896, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
main features of the doctrine, and where there are controlling
California decisions, there is no occasion to look elsewhere.76
DOES IT REALLY MATTER?
This question involves a two part inquiry: (1) whether the
policies supporting comparative negligence are compatible with
those supporting strict products liability, and (2) what practical
effect the application of comparative negligence to strict prod-
ucts liability will have.
The first question must be viewed as a balancing of the re-
spective policies. Its resolution will also depend upon the an-
swer to the second question since the practical effect of the
application of comparative negligence to strict products liabili-
ty may enhance those policies supporting comparative negli-
gence while detracting from the policies supporting strict prod-
ucts liability to an unacceptable degree, and vice versa.
Comparative negligence is predicated on the desire of the
courts to relieve the plaintiff of the harsh "all or nothing" rule of
contributory negligence and to apportion liability and damages
in proportion to fault in cases based on negligence. 77 The
rationale is simply and succinctly stated by Harper and James,
and cited by the Li court:
There is no justification-in either policy or doctrine-for the rule of
contributory negligence, except for the feeling that if one man is to be
held liable because of his fault, then the fault of him who seeks to
enforce that liability should also be considered. But this nation does
not require that all or nothing rule, which would exonerate a very
negligent defendant for even the slight fault of his victim. The logical
corallary of the fault principle would be a rule of comparative or
proportional negligence not the present rule. (emphasis added)78
The court made explicit what it meant by the term "fault" in a
modification order issued after the decision in Li. In effect it
substituted the term "negligence" for that of "fault". In a foot-
note it explained:
In emplying the generic term "fault" throughout this opinion we fol-
low a usage~common to the literature on the subject of comparative
negligence. In all cases, however, we intend the term to import noth-
ing more than "negligence" in the accepted legal sense. (emphasis
added)7 9
The emphasis in a negligence action is on fault. In deciding a
negligence action the court analyzes the conduct of both parties
and a decision as to liability is rendered on the basis of fault.
76. S.F. Bridge Co. v. Dumarton Co., 119 Cal. 272, 275, 51 P. 335, 336 (1897).
77. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 810-812, 532 P.2d 1226, 1230-32, 119
Cal. Rptr. 858, 862-64 (1975). See notes 3, 4 and 5.
78. Id. at 810 n.3, 352 P.2d at 1230-31 n.3, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 862 n.3.
79. Id. at 813 n.6a, 532 P.2d at 1232 n.6a, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864 n.6a.
[Vol. 5:501, 1978] Comparative Fault and Strict Liability
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Strict products liability reverses this emphasis and gives pri-
mary concern to consumer protection and compensation. 0
Under the Greenman doctrine, an analysis of fault is at least of
secondary importance and only in certain limited areas can it be
considered at all.81 Such an approach constitutes a recognition
that consumers are at a disadvantage in the marketplace and
need to be protected.
In view of these observations, it is difficult to perceive the
compatibility of the two doctrines. Strict products liability was
developed, in part, to avoid all of the difficulties inherent in a
search for proof of conduct which rings of negligence.82
The practical effect of the application of comparative negli-
gence to strict products liability supports the view that the
policies supporting the respective doctrines are not compatible.
An apparent problem is the theoretical and practical difficul-
ty inherent in attempting to compare the contributory negli-
gence of the plaintiff with a defect in a product. In Buccery v.
General Motors Corp., the Court of Appeals noted the difficulty
and stated:
Comparative negligence, therefore, as adopted in Li, entails a
comparison of the respective negligence of the plaintiff on the one
hand and of the defendant on the other. Strict liability for defective
products is not based. upon defendant's negligence. There may be,
therefore, no negligence of the defendant to compare with that of
plaintiff. (emphasis added)83
The problem is demonstrated well in those situations where a
retailer does nothing more than move the product in the stream
of commerce, as in Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.84 In Hauter
v. Zogarts8 5 a seller and a manufacturer were held strictly liable
when the court found that the product was defectively designed
as a matter of law. In Kasel v. Remington Arms8" a trademark
licensor was held strictly liable for injuries resulting from a
defective shotgun shell which had never even passed through
his hands and the court said:
80. See cases and quotes cited at notes 9, 10 and 16.
81. See Section on DEFENSES TO STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY, in text at p.
509.
82. See note 11, supra.
83. 60 Cal. App. 3d 553, 549, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605, 615 (1976).
84. 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
85. 14 Cal. 3d 104, 534 P.2d 377, 120 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1965).
86. 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1972).
Also California has utilized the enterprise stream of commerce liabili-
ty concept in the strict liability field without regard for the individual
defendant's control...81
Any attempt to compare the contributory negligence of the
defendant with the elusive and mythical fault of the defendant
will justifiably renew the objection by the court in Cronin that
the interjection of negligence concepts in strict products liabili-
ty "places upon. . . [the plaintiff]. . . a significantly increased
burden and represents a step backward in the area pioneered
by this court."88
In addition to the problem of comparing contributory negli-
gence of the plaintiff with a mere defect, the application of
comparative negligence to strict products liability will create
other proof problems for the plaintiff.
The plaintiff will not only have to prove that the product had a
defect which caused injury, but will also be forced to present
proof of negligent acts and omissions of the defendant, if any
exist, to reduce his own percentage of negligence. In effect, the
burden of proof placed on the plaintiff would be exactly similar
to that required in a negligence action.
The barrage of expert witnesses that could be unleashed by
an economically superior defendant, once the question of
comparative fault is an issue, would be overwhelming. In such
an atmosphere, the issue could rarely be restrained to a
comparison between a contributorily negligent plaintiff and the
defective product. The plaintiff would be in constant jeopardy
of refuting evidence that the defendant exercised reasonable
and ordinary care in the design and production of the product.
The inherent difficulties of the traditional cause of action in
negligence would, once again, confront the plaintiff, and the
Greenman doctrine would stand as a eunuch at the threshold of
a chamber wherein a harem of consumers, powerless to protect
themselves, await, guarded but guarded not.
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of strict products liability, as developed in
California, is a unique remedy designed primarily to protect
those consumers who are powerless to protect themselves. It is
based upon the reasoning that the ". . .risk of the occurrence of
injuries caused by a defective product is a constant risk and a
general one;" that ". . . against such a risk there should be a
87. Id. at 725, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 323-24.
88. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972).
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general and constant protection;" and that ". . . the manufac-
turer is best suited to afford such protection." 9 It was addition-
ally designed to remove the burdensome "luggage" and
"complications", 90 inherent in actions based on negligence and
warranty concepts from the plaintiff's shoulders.
The emphasis of the Greenman doctrine is on consumer pro-
tection and compensation. In this respect it is a distinct remedy
as compared to what other jurisdictions call strict products
liability. Thus, it is inappropriate and misleading to look to
other jurisdictions for guidance in the further development of
this remedy, which has been given significant viability by a
progressive California court.
The current limitations on manufacturer liability under the
Greenman doctrine are sufficient to screen the undeserving
plaintiffs who do not need the protection provided by this
unique remedy. A plaintiff may not recover unless: (1) the injury
was proximately caused by a defective product, defective when
it left the hands of the defendant; (2) the product was being used
in a reasonably foreseeable manner; and (3) the plaintiff did not
assume the risk of injury from the defect.
If plaintiff conduct which consists of ordinary negligence,
failure to discover the defect or failure to take precautions
against the possibility of its existence, is allowed to decrease
recovery, then the underlying policies of the Greenman doctrine
will be given little effect. Such a plaintiff, whose confidence in
the quality and safety of products has been generated by manu-
facturer advertising and marketing devices, is, in reality, power-
less to protect himself since he was not aware of the defect.
Along with the theoretical and practical problems of compar-
ing plaintiff's conduct with the mere existence of a defect, will
come other proof burdens for the plaintiff. In order to reduce
his own percentage of fault, a plaintiff would not only be re-
quired to prove 'that the product had a defect which caused
injury, but such plaintiff would also have to show that the
manufacturer's particular acts and omissions were far more
culpable than his own. The plaintiff would additionally have the
burden of refuting evidence, submitted by the manufacturer,
89. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
90. W. PROSSER, TORTS, 656 (4th ed. 1971).
that it exercised reasonable and ordinary care in the design and
production of the product.
In conclusion therefore, returning to concepts of negligence
implicit in any system of comparative fault will, in effect, not
only abrogate the Greenman doctrine and dilute the remedy of
strict products liability to an ineffective level, but most im-
portantly, it will constitute an abandonment of the policy rea-
sons of consumer protection and compensation so heavily em-
phasized by the California courts.
C.R. HICKEY
